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I.   INTRODUCTION
The summary judgment procedure has undergone a significant transfor-
mation in recent years. Historically, summary judgment was a rarely used
procedural device, designed “to preserve the court from frivolous defenses
and to defeat attempts to use formal pleading as means to delay the recovery
of just demands.”1 Even after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which extended summary judgment to all cases and parties,2 courts
remained wary of summary disposition because they “perceiv[ed] it as
threatening a denial of such fundamental guarantees as the right to confront
witnesses, the right of the jury to make inferences and determinations of
credibility, and the right to have one’s cause advocated by counsel before a
jury.”3 The standard formulation was that summary judgment should be
denied whenever there was the “slightest doubt as to the facts.”4
                                                                                                         
* Senior Appellate Attorney, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, Washington, D.C. J.D., 1985, Creighton University. This Article was
written in the author’s private capacity. No official support or endorsement by the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or any other agency of the United States
government is intended or should be inferred.
1. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902) (quoted in Samuel
Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE
L.J. 73, 76 (1990)).
2. See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 76 (discussing adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules and their impact on summary judgment).
3. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 77 (citing Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872,
873 (2d Cir. 1949)).
4. Armco Steel Corp. v. Realty Inv. Co., 273 F.2d 483, 484 (8th Cir. 1960) (cited in
9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2532, at 307 (1995)).
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In recent years, summary judgment has been recast as a primary
mechanism for disposing of litigation.5 The strong presumption against
the use of summary judgment has given way to a vigorous employment of
the procedure.6 In theory, courts still adhere to the view that summary
judgment should be granted with caution, particularly in cases where state
of mind is a decisive element of a claim or defense.7 In practice, the
granting of summary judgment has become a routine part of federal prac-
tice.8
The Supreme Court provided the legal impetus for the change in the
approach to summary judgment in a trilogy of cases decided in the mid-
1980s, wherein the Court restructured the respective burdens of plaintiffs
and defendants in the summary judgment process.9 Of particular note, the
Court held that the governing standard of persuasion applied at the sum-
mary judgment stage; this meant that the plaintiff was typically required
to proffer affirmative evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
while the defendant was required to adduce little proof in support of its
motion.10 The Court equated its role in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment with its role in ruling on a directed verdict11 and suggested that
a court could properly use the summary procedure to assess the plaintiff’s
chances of prevailing at trial. The Court’s decisions had the effect of re-
                                                                                                         
5. See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 89 (asserting that “summary judg-
ment has moved beyond its originally intended role as a guarantor of the existence of material
issues to be resolved at trial and has been transformed into a mechanism to assess plaintiff’s
likelihood of prevailing at trial”); Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate
Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 267, 319-20 nn.313-14 (1995) (citing to a pronounced increase in the use of the summary
judgment procedure).
6. There are strong indications in many recent decisions that courts have essentially col-
lapsed the fact-finding function into the summary judgment procedure and have thereby con-
verted summary judgment into a “mini-trial” on the merits. See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous
Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and
ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 229 (1993) (stressing that the summary judgment proce-
dure has been interpreted “to permit courts to draw inferences in defendants’ favor, to weigh
evidence, to decide the credibility of witnesses, and to require plaintiffs to prove their cases at
the summary judgment stage”) (citations omitted).
7. Miller v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 906 F.2d 972, 974 (4th Cir. 1990).
8. This is true even in civil rights cases, which typically involve “subtle questions of
credibility and intent that only a factfinder faced with a live witness should decide.” McGinley,
supra note 6, at 208 n.19 (citing to cases demonstrating a tendency on the part of courts to
grant summary judgment “more aggressively in civil rights cases”); see also Issacharoff &
Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 88-89 n.84 (citing to several employment discrimination cases in
asserting that “[c]ourts have shown a new willingness to resolve issues of intent or motive at
the summary judgment stage”).
9. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066
(1988); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
10. Compare Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (discussing plaintiff’s burden as nonmoving
party) with Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (discussing defendant’s burden as moving party).
11. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-52.
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quiring a plaintiff to try her case in response to a motion for summary
judgment, while they afforded courts a much broader role in assessing the
merits of a plaintiff’s case at the summary judgment stage.12
The Supreme Court’s decisions on summary judgment corresponded
with broader concerns about the ability of courts to manage an increas-
ingly burdensome caseload. The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure facilitated changes in the summary judgment procedure
by granting district courts unprecedented case management powers.13
Even before the Supreme Court trilogy, there were signs that lower courts
were moving toward a more expansive use of the summary judgment pro-
cedure.14 Some courts and commentators “thought the time [was] ripe for
recognizing the potential of summary judgments to deal with increasingly
crowded dockets and rising litigation costs.”15 The trilogy solidified this
trend and paved the way for the “modern era” of summary judgment
practice.16
While the changes in the summary judgment procedure have been
widely documented, less attention has been paid to the impact of these
changes on other procedural devices, most notably the impact on judg-
ment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.17 In a system in which summary judgment is rarely employed, the
Rule 50 procedures exist as a legitimate mechanism by which courts can
                                                                                                         
12. See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 87 (“As a consequence of the tril-
ogy, the Court appears to have transformed summary judgment from a mechanism for assuring
a modicum of genuine dispute in cases set for trial to a full dress rehearsal for trial with legal
burdens and evidentiary standards to match those that would apply at trial.”); McGinley, supra
note 6, at 222-23 (arguing that the trilogy “encourages, if not requires, judges to weigh the
evidence,” while it forces plaintiffs to “present concrete evidence of the defendants’ lack of
credibility in response to summary judgment motions”).
13. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 78-79; see Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
14. See McGinley, supra note 6, at 208 n.19 (stressing that “even before the trilogy, a
number of courts seemed headed toward the improper use of summary judgment”).
15. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary
Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 450 (1991).
16. Frank J. Cavaliere, The Recent “Respectability” of Summary Judgments and Directed
Verdicts in Intentional Age Discrimination Cases: ADEA Case Analysis Through the Supreme
Court’s Summary Judgment “Prism," 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 103, 107 (1993) (trilogy “placed
courts in an era where summary judgments have become respectable”); McGinley, supra note
6, at 221 (referring to the “new summary judgment”).
17. Rule 50(a) provides that a court may grant “judgment as a matter of law” against a
party “[i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 50(a). Rule 50(b) provides that the motion may be renewed and granted after a jury
has returned a verdict. Historically, motions under these provisions were described as a motion
for directed verdict—in the case of Rule 50(a)—and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict—in the case of Rule 50(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). The 1991 amendments to Rule 50
eliminated the dual terminology and opted for the single label of “judgment as a matter of law”
to describe motions made under both provisions. See 5A JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 50.07(2) (2d ed. 1995).
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ensure that juries do not impermissibly stray from the facts or law. In a
system, however, where summary judgment is commonplace, the use of
such procedures, as a second trump on the jury’s decisionmaking role, is
harder to defend. In the modern era of summary judgment, the plaintiff is
effectively required to put forth her entire case at summary judgment and
persuade the court that a reasonable fact finder could rule in the plaintiff’s
favor. Summary judgment is very close to a “dress-rehearsal” of the ulti-
mate trial,18 with the same standard applied at summary judgment as
would be applied in ruling on a Rule 50 motion.19 Given these parallel
standards, what justification exists for dismissing a case, at or after trial,
where the plaintiff has survived summary judgment?20
This Article explores the relationship between the rise of summary
judgment and the nature of Rule 50 practice. The Rule 50 procedures re-
main in common use, despite the substantial change in the operation of
summary judgment. The Article argues that the indiscriminate use of
these procedures is increasingly suspect in light of the changes in the ap-
proach to summary judgment. Certainly, where a defendant has been de-
nied summary judgment, the granting of relief under Rule 50, based on
the same arguments advanced in support of summary judgment, is a
troubling result. In fact, the law of the case doctrine strongly suggests that
a court should adhere to its previous denial of summary judgment once a
case goes to trial, absent a pertinent change in the governing legal stan-
dards or a substantial unraveling, at trial, of the plaintiff’s case. As the
Article discusses more fully below, the significant increase in the use of
summary judgment, under the Supreme Court trilogy, should result in a
concomitant reduction in the use of the Rule 50 procedures.
                                                                                                         
18. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 87.
19. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing standard). It should be
noted that the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 is not the same
standard that applies to a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. See 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2806, at 63 (1995). In consider-
ing a Rule 59 motion, “the judge is free to weigh the evidence for himself.” Id. at 67. The
judge may set aside the verdict and order a new trial “even though there is substantial evidence
to support [the verdict].” Id. at 65. This Article focuses solely on the relationship between the
summary judgment and Rule 50 procedures.
20. Summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 are legally avail-
able to both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs, however, rarely obtain summary judgment
and are rarely granted judgment under Rule 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 50. In practice, these are de-
vices by which defendants can circumvent or trump the fact-finding process. See Issacharoff &
Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 75, 92 (noting that summary judgment is rarely sought or ob-
tained by plaintiffs and that “liberalized summary judgment inhibits the filing of otherwise
meritorious suits and results in a wealth transfer from plaintiffs as a class to defendants as a
class”); 5A MOORE, supra note 17, ¶ 50.02(1), at 50-36 (“The courts are reluctant to grant a
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the party having the burden of persuasion.”).
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II.   SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE RULE 50 PROCEDURES: THEIR
ORIGINS AND HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has its origins in the
common law principle that when no evidence proves a particular fact, the
court is obligated, upon request, to instruct the jury.21 As historically
applied, the “directed verdict,” as it came to be known, was literally an
instruction to the jury. The jury was instructed that, as a matter of law,
they would be permitted to deliberate the case even if the party having the
burden of proving certain facts had no evidence to prove these facts.22
Over time, the directed verdict evolved into a device by which a court
could enter judgment in its own right where the evidence was so insub-
stantial that it did not justify submission of the case to the jury.23
As initially adopted, Rule 50 provided two distinct procedures. Sub-
section (a) allowed the granting of a directed verdict on a motion made
any time before submission of the case to the jury.24 Subsection (b) per-
mitted the motion to be renewed after trial and authorized a court to enter
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if it believed that the winning
party’s case was not sustained by the evidence.25 The thrust of both pro-
cedures was to permit a court “to take away from the jury’s consideration
cases or issues when the facts [were] sufficiently clear that the law re-
quire[d] a particular result.”26
In contrast to the directed verdict, “[s]ummary judgment is a relative
newcomer to the Anglo-American legal scene.”27 Initially, the procedure
was a mechanism “to combat the ‘law’s delay’ by allowing courts to
strike ‘any frivolous or sham defense to the whole or to any part of the
complaint.’ ”28 The procedure provided plaintiffs with “a motion some-
what akin to a post-pleading default judgment.”29 In the beginning of this
century, summary judgment began to emerge as a device by which both
parties could obtain judgment in certain categories of cases.30 By the time
of adoption of the Federal Rules, several state systems permitted the granting
                                                                                                         
21. Greenleaf v. Birth, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 292, 299 (1835).
22. William W. Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICH. L.
REV. 555, 589 (1950).
23. Southern Ry. Co. v. Walters, 284 U.S. 190, 194 (1931). For a thorough history of
the development of the directed verdict, see Blume, supra note 22.
24. 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 2521, at 240.
25. Id.
26. Id. As stated supra note 17, the current rule uses the term “judgment as a matter of law”
to refer to motions under both subsections (a) and (b). It is firmly established that the same stan-
dards apply to the granting of motions under the respective provisions. See id. § 2524, at 249-50.
27. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 76.
28. Id. (quoting An Act To Regulate the Practice of Courts of Law, ch. 231, 1912 N.J.
Laws 377, 380; 2 N.J. COMP. STAT. §§ 15, 16 (Supp. 1915)).
29. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 76.
30. See 10 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2711, at
557 (1995).
694 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:689
of summary judgment, although the procedure remained an “exceptional
practice.”31
In its adoption, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was made
“applicable to all actions.”32 The Rule was fashioned as a “method for
promptly disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact.”33 The Rule made summary judgment available, “at least in
principle, as a broad-scale tool for the entry of a final decree on the merits of
all claims before the federal courts.”34
Summary judgment, as adopted in the Federal Rules, shared a common
purpose with Rule 50. Motions under both rules invited the court to make the
same determination—that there was no genuine issue of fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.35 Both rules pro-
vided methods for facilitating the speedy resolution of litigation.36 As one
court explained, “In the final analysis,” both procedures “turn[ed] on whether
any genuine issue of fact survive[d] the pleadings and depositions or evidence,
requiring fact-findings. . . . [I]n both instances the trial court [was] empow-
ered and enjoined to look through transparency to substance.”37
However, courts took substantially different views of the use of these pro-
cedural devices. In the context of Rule 50 motions, they showed little hesi-
tancy in granting relief in favor of a defendant in a case where the plaintiff’s
evidence, as fully developed at trial, was insufficient to sustain the plaintiff’s
case.38 A common formulation of the test required the court to enter a directed
verdict unless there was “substantial evidence” in opposition to the motion.39
Courts repeatedly rejected the view that a “scintilla” of evidence was
                                                                                                         
31. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 76.
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee notes, 1937 adoption.
33. Id.
34. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 76.
35. 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 30, § 2713.1, at 613-14.
36. Compare Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 250 (1940) (“[Rule
50] was adopted for the purpose of speeding litigation and preventing unnecessary retrials.”)
with Bland v. Norfolk & S. R.R., 406 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1969) (“[T]he function of a
motion for summary judgment is . . . to conserve judicial time and energy by avoiding an un-
necessary trial and by providing a speedy and efficient summary disposition.”).
37. Fischer Constr. Co. v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 271, 275-76 (10th Cir.
1969).
38. There were concerns raised as to whether the granting of a directed verdict contra-
vened the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. Those concerns were put to rest
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943). Courts
fully embraced the view that “no constitutional question arises when the court withdraws from
the jury a case in which there is no issue of fact requiring the jury’s determination.” Manaia v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 268 F.2d 793, 799 (4th Cir.) (stressing that the power of the court
to withdraw such cases from the jury “is a protective restriction as necessary to the vigorous
functioning of the jury system as preservation of the prerogatives of the jury”), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 913 (1959) (quoted in 9A WRIGHT & MILLER,  supra note 4, § 2522, at 246).
39. See Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal
Courts, 55 MINN. L. REV. 903, 920-21 (1971); Blume, supra note 22, at 581; 9A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 4, § 2524.
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enough to avoid a directed verdict and emphasized that a stricter standard
was necessary to maintain the court’s control over the jury’s decisionmak-
ing role.40 A directed verdict was not merely “a device to save time and
trouble involved in lengthy jury determination” but a “method for protect-
ing neutral principles of law from powerful forces outside the scope of
law—compassion and prejudice.”41
By contrast, there was enormous reluctance to dismiss cases at the
summary judgment stage even when the plaintiff’s case appeared weak.42
The Second Circuit, in particular, adopted a standard which precluded the
granting of summary judgment where there was the “slightest doubt” as
to whether the plaintiff could prevail at trial.43 The court stressed that
where the ascertainment of the facts turns on credibility, a triable issue of
fact is present, and the granting of summary judgment is improper.44 In
the court’s view:
That one reasonably may surmise that the plaintiff is unlikely to prevail
upon a trial, is not a sufficient basis for refusing him his day in court
with respect to issues which are not shown to be sham, frivolous, or so
unsubstantial that it would obviously be futile to try them.45
Other courts adopted similar formulations of the summary judgment
standard. The Fourth Circuit ruled that summary judgment could be
granted only when it was “perfectly clear that no issue of fact [was] in-
volved.”46 The court stressed that the purpose of Rule 56 was to provide
“a prompt disposition of cases which have no possible merit.”47 The
Eighth Circuit agreed that summary judgment was appropriate only in
those “extreme situations” where a party was entitled to relief “beyond all
doubt, without room for controversy.”48 Courts commonly ruled that
summary judgment was to be denied anytime there was “doubt whether
an issue of fact [had] been raised”49 or “a reasonable indication that a
                                                                                                         
40. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 343 (1933).
41. Rutherford v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 278 F.2d 310, 312 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 922 (1960).
42. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 77 (stressing that “[f]rom its inception,
federal judges treated summary judgment warily”); Schwarzer et al., supra note 15, at 450
(noting that the “[p]erceived judicial hostility to summary judgment motions and the onerous
burdens of proof imposed on a moving party discouraged use of the summary judgment proce-
dure, even in cases in which it might have been appropriate”).
43. E.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1970).
44. Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2nd Cir. 1949).
45. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 475 n.34 (2d Cir. 1946) (quoting Sprague v. Vogt,
150 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1945)). For a discussion of the Second Circuit’s standard, see Issa-
charoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 77.
46. Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950).
47. Id.
48. Williams v. Chick, 373 F.2d 330, 331 (8th Cir. 1967) (adding that “[r]ecovery must
be barred beyond any discernible circumstances”).
49. See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
696 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:689
material fact [was] in dispute.”50 The Supreme Court itself cautioned
against the use of summary judgment and adopted standards that were
widely interpreted as imposing a substantial evidentiary burden on the
movant to disprove the plaintiff’s case.51
Judicial hostility toward the summary judgment procedure appeared to
stem primarily from the timing of the motion. Summary judgment permit-
ted disposition of the case prior to trial. Historically, courts were reluc-
tant to dispose of a case without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to de-
velop fully the evidentiary basis for her case and contest the defendant’s
proofs at trial.52 They emphasized that the court’s role at summary judg-
ment was not to “explore all the factual ramifications of the case”53 but to
“eliminate the frivolous lawsuits which might occasionally arise.”54 Once
the case had proceeded to trial, judges felt better positioned to assess the
plaintiff’s evidence and to make the determination as to whether the case
was jury submissible.55
This view of the judiciary’s approach to the summary judgment and
Rule 50 procedures is confirmed by a line of cases specifically discussing
the standard for granting summary judgment in relation to a later ruling
under Rule 50. In a widely followed case, Pierce v. Ford Motor Co.,56 the
Fourth Circuit held that the district court had improperly granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant.57  The court ruled that a court
could deny summary judgment even if the court were convinced that the
plaintiff’s case would not survive a motion for directed verdict at trial.58
As the court explained:
                                                                                                         
50. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Cooper Wells & Co., 234 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1956).
51. Schwarzer et al., supra note 15, at 450 (discussing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144 (1970)).
52. See, e.g., Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 464 (1962).
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex . . . liti-
gation where motive and intent play leading roles. . . . It is only when the witnesses
are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to
be given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial
by jury which so long has been the hallmark of even handed justice.
Id. at 473.
53. See, e.g., Ayala v. Secretary of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 51 F.R.D. 505, 507 (D.
Puerto Rico 1971).
54. See, e.g., Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); see also New Home Appliance Ctr., Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881, 883 (10th
Cir. 1957) (“[S]ummary judgment is available to avoid expensive trials of frivolous claims.”).
55. See, e.g., Kim v. Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055, 1059 (4th Cir. 1981)
(stressing that the legal standards for summary judgment and directed verdict were different in
that, at the summary judgment stage, “the district court must give the benefit of the doubt to
the party who asserts he can prove a dubious proposition at trial” while, in considering a mo-
tion for a directed verdict, “the district court has had the benefit of seeing what the parties al-
leged they could prove prior to trial tested in the crucible of open court”).
56. 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951).
57. Id. at 910.
58. Id.
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From what we have said, it is clear that there were issues in the cases
for a jury to decide, and it was error to enter summary judgments for
defendant for that reason. It is only where it is perfectly clear that there
are no issues in the case that a summary judgment is proper. Even in
cases where the judge is of opinion that he will have to direct a verdict
for one party or the other on the issues that have been raised, he should
ordinarily hear the evidence and direct the verdict rather than attempt
to try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment, which
was never intended to enable parties to evade jury trials or have the
judge weigh the evidence in advance of its being presented.59
Other courts expressed similar views concerning the relationship be-
tween the two procedures. The Eighth Circuit, for example, agreed that a
court should “ ‘ordinarily hear the evidence and direct the verdict rather
than attempt to try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment.’
”60 The court stressed that a court may not enter judgment as a matter of
law—at the summary judgment stage—in a manner similar to a directed
verdict at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).61 As the
court explained, even if a court feels that summary judgment in a given case
is technically proper, “sound judicial policy and the proper exercise of ju-
dicial discretion may prompt him to deny the motion and permit the case to
be developed fully at trial. The ultimate legal rights of the movant can al-
ways be protected in the course of or even after trial.”62
In Davidson v. Stanadyne, Inc.,63 the Fifth Circuit also advanced the
view that summary judgment could be denied even where a directed verdict,
on the same record, might be appropriate.64 The court noted that forcing a
party to present her entire case before the court during pretrial motions was
not the purpose of the summary judgment motion.65 It cautioned that courts
should exercise “[r]estraint in the use of [the summary judgment] proce-
dure” in light of the “difference in the burdens which a plaintiff faces in
opposing a motion for summary judgment and in opposing a motion for
directed verdict.”66
                                                                                                         
59. Id. at 915.
60. Williams v. Chick, 373 F.2d 330, 331-32 (8th Cir. 1967) (quoting Pierce, 190 F.2d at
915).
61. Hughes v. American Jawa, Ltd., 529 F.2d 21, 25 (8th Cir. 1976) (stressing that
“[t]he District Court must deny the motion for summary judgment after finding a genuine fac-
tual dispute even if it is convinced that the party opposing the motion is unlikely to prevail at
trial”).
62. Roberts v. Browning, 610 F.2d 528, 536 (8th Cir. 1979).
63. 718 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1983).
64. Id. at 1341.
65. Id. at 1340.
66. Id. at 1341. See also United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. Lee Nat’l
Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (denying summary judgment while acknowledging
that “[i]f the record before [the court] at trial were the same as that before [the court] on this
motion, judgment would be entered in favor of the [defendant]”); Curto’s, Inc. v. Krich-New
Jersey, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 235, 238 (D.N.J. 1961) (stating that “[i]t is only where there
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In 1985, on the eve of the Supreme Court trilogy, the Fourth Circuit
revisited the standards for granting summary judgment.67 The court reit-
erated its view that summary judgment was proper “[o]nly where it [was]
‘perfectly clear that there [were] no issues in the case.’ ”68 The court em-
phasized that “the district court should not try the case in advance by
summary judgment [even] where a directed verdict would be proper after
hearing the evidence.”69
As these cases make clear, there was a marked difference, historically,
between the use of summary judgment and Rule 50 procedures. Courts
would permit a case to go forward at the summary judgment stage if there
was any doubt as to whether the plaintiff could present a viable case at
trial. They would then employ Rule 50 procedures to ensure that the jury
did not stray beyond its permissible role. In essence, there was a two-
track system for passing on the evidentiary sufficiency of a plaintiff’s
case. Cases that were wholly without evidentiary support were weeded
out at the summary judgment stage. Cases that could survive summary
judgment but could not ultimately be sustained were handled under Rule
50. It was the Rule 50 procedures, not summary judgment, that provided
the primary method by which courts exercised case management control
over litigation.
III.   GRANTING JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 50 WHEN SUMMARY
JUDGMENT HAS BEEN DENIED: THE PRE-TRILOGY VIEW
Given these historical views, judicial response was predictable regard-
ing an argument that the denial of summary judgment limited the court’s
ability later to enter judgment in favor of the moving party under Rule 50.
Because stricter rules apply to a motion for summary judgment than to
those on a motion for directed verdict, the fact that the district court had
previously denied summary judgment was of no moment.70 Indeed, as dis-
cussed above, the historical standards for summary judgment contem-
plated that the plaintiff could survive summary judgment and ultimately
fail to take her case to a jury.
                                                                                                         
clearly are no issues in the case that a summary judgment is proper” and that “[e]ven in an in-
stance where the Court may feel it will have to direct a verdict on the issues which have been
raised, it should ordinarily hear the evidence, rather than attempt to dispose of the case sum-
marily”); Arkansas v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 102 F. Supp. 444, 447 (W.D. Ark. 1952)
(stressing that “only in a rare case can it be determined by affidavit that the evidence available
will be such as to entitle the movant, if the case were tried on its merits to a jury, to a directed
verdict because there has been no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses”).
67. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985).
68. Id. at 364 (quoting Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910, 915 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951)).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Farrell v. Hollingsworth, 43 F.R.D. 362, 365 (D.S.C. 1968).
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A long line of pre-trilogy cases addressed the question of whether the
denial of summary judgment had any preclusive effect on the subsequent
granting of a Rule 50 motion. In some cases, a court was confronted with
a defendant’s Rule 50 motion after having denied summary judgment. In
other cases, a trial court was confronted with the motion after an appellate
court had reversed the grant of summary judgment and permitted the case
to proceed to trial. In both contexts, judges uniformly rejected the view
that the denial of summary judgment had any effect on the granting of re-
lief under Rule 50.
The Fifth Circuit developed the most extensive body of law on the re-
lationship between summary judgment and Rule 50 procedures. In several
cases, the court made clear that a reversal of a district court’s grant of
summary judgment did not foreclose the district court, on remand, from
entering a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. In Robbins v. Milner
Enterprises, Inc.,71 the court ruled that a denial of summary judgment did
not foreclose a directed verdict since the evidence that is ultimately ad-
duced at trial may convince the court that the defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.72 The court stressed that “the issues may be
such that only after the agony of a full-blown trial may it authoritatively
be determined that there was never really the decisive issue of fact at
all.”73 In the court’s view, the denial of summary judgment meant only
that there existed a “ ‘reasonable doubt’. . . about the existence of a
genuine controversy” as the record existed at that time.74
Similarly, in Braniff v. Jackson Avenue-Gretna Ferry, Inc.,75 the court
ruled that the reversal of summary judgment did not “foreclose the right
and the imperative duty of the District Judge to test the case against the
actual evidence adduced at every stage of the trial.”76 Nor did it “forecast
that on remand the case must go to the jury.”77 According to the court,
that depended upon the actual proof made, and that proof might fall
short.78
In Gleason v. Title Guarantee Co.,79 the court rejected the argument
that since the evidence before the district court at the summary judgment
stage was substantially the same as the evidence produced at trial, the
motion for a directed verdict should have been denied.80 The court noted
                                                                                                         
71. 278 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1960).
72. Id. at 496.
73. Id. at 497.
74. Id. at 496 (citation omitted).
75. 280 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1960).
76. Id. at 529.
77. Id.
78. Id.; accord Sheets v. Burman, 322 F.2d 277, 281 (5th Cir. 1963); Stanley v. Guy
Scroggins Constr. Co., 297 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1961).
79. 317 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963).
80. Id. at 58.
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that “[a] motion for summary judgment is similar to a motion for a di-
rected verdict in the sense that both motions function in the interest of
saving money, time, and effort when there is no genuine issue of material
fact,” but it stressed that “the motions operate differently and produce
different results.”81 Specifically, a court may deny summary judgment on
the ground that it is better to afford the nonmoving party the opportunity
to develop her case and adduce the evidence at trial. After the court has
“heard testimony at a live trial,” it can then determine whether the party’s
evidence is sufficient to present a jury question.82 In short, “[s]ound prac-
tical reasons [] may justify a trial judge’s denying a motion for summary
judgment even on the identical evidence supporting his granting a directed
verdict.”83
In subsequent cases, the Fifth Circuit reiterated its position on the non-
preclusive effect of a denial of summary judgment. In Gross v. Southern
Railway Co.,84 the court ruled that its previous reversal of the district
court’s grant of summary judgment did not preclude the district court
from giving “due consideration” to the defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict.85 The court stated that its prior opinion “could not, of course,
foreclose the issues which were the subject of the full-dress trial on the
merits, insofar as possible directed verdicts were concerned.”86 In a later
case, it again ruled that the district court’s denial of summary judgment
did not preclude a directed verdict even though the evidence presented at
trial was essentially the same as the evidence submitted at the summary
judgment stage.87 The argument for preclusion “erroneously assume[d]
that the standards for a summary judgment denial and for a directed ver-
dict ruling are the same.”88 As the court explained: “At the summary
judgment stage, the court focuses on whether there exists a genuine issue
of material fact; once the evidence is all in, the trial court is entitled to
examine the actual proof and determine if the proof falls short of present-
ing a jury question.”89
Other courts echoed these sentiments. The Eighth Circuit, for exam-
ple, postulated that a court’s denial of summary judgment did not affect
its grant of a directed verdict because the court’s review of the evidence
differed once the case proceeded to trial.90 The court noted that
                                                                                                         
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting JAMES WM. MOORE, 6 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56.02(10), at
56-46 (2d ed. 1995)).
83. Id.
84. 446 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1971).
85. Id. at 1060.
86. Id. at 1061 n.1.
87. Pruet Prod. Co. v. Ayles, 784 F.2d 1275, 1278 (5th Cir. 1986).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Armco Steel Corp. v. Realty Inv. Co., 273 F.2d 483, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1960).
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[a] genuine issue of fact exists for the purpose of avoiding a summary
judgment whenever there is the slightest doubt as to the facts. . . .
When, however, both parties have had an opportunity to adduce all
relevant, available evidence so that the trial court is no longer uncertain
as to the circumstances of the case, then slight doubt as to the facts is
insufficient to avert a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.91
The First Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Voutour v. Vitale.92
The court ruled that the denial of summary judgment did not foreclose a
defendant’s right at the close of evidence to seek the district court’s re-
view of the legal sufficiency of the evidence.93 It reasoned that “[b]y then,
especially after examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the par-
ties may well have presented a far more complete and meaningful pic-
ture.”94
Clearly, judges were unsympathetic to the view that the denial of
summary judgment in any way circumscribed a trial court’s role in ruling
on a subsequent motion under Rule 50.95 When a defendant renewed a
challenge to the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s case at trial, the court re-
viewed the defendant’s challenge without reference to any previous ruling
on summary judgment. The Rule 50 procedures may have had some rela-
tion to summary judgment, but they provided an independent mechanism
for testing the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s case.
IV.   GRANTING JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 50 WHEN SUMMARY
JUDGMENT HAS BEEN DENIED: THE EFFECT OF THE TRILOGY
While judges accorded no presumptive significance to the denial of
summary judgment, their views on this subject were inextricably tied to
the existing standards for granting summary judgment. Where summary
judgment was a rarely used procedural device, it was perfectly logical to
permit independent review of a Rule 50 motion even in the wake of a
previous challenge to the plaintiff’s case at the summary judgment stage.
Indeed, to do otherwise would leave the court without any meaningful
control over jury decisionmaking, given the lax standards that governed at
summary judgment. What happens, however, when summary judgment
undergoes the type of transformation that has occurred under the Supreme
Court trilogy? Can the historical view on this point withstand the funda-
mental change in the judiciary’s use of summary judgment?
                                                                                                         
91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. 761 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986).
93. Id. at 827.
94. Id. (citation omitted).
95. In addition to the above cases, see, e.g., Catts Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 723 F.2d 1494,
1502 (10th Cir. 1983); Sandoval v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 544 F.2d
463, 464-65 (10th Cir. 1976).
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As the above discussion suggests, courts offered several grounds to
explain why an unsuccessful challenge to plaintiff’s case at summary
judgment had no impact on a renewed challenge to the plaintiff’s case at
trial. Primarily, different legal standards applied to summary judgment
and Rule 50 motions; the differences made the denial of summary judg-
ment of no legal consequence once the case proceeded to trial. More
broadly, courts stressed that because plaintiffs were not required to put
forth all their supporting evidence at summary judgment, it was better for
the court to delay ruling on the sufficiency of a case until the plaintiff had
a full opportunity to develop it. Under that view, the denial of summary
judgment meant only that the plaintiff might be able to withstand a di-
rected verdict—once she had fully developed her proofs—not that she had
sufficient evidence to submit the case to a jury. In a similar vein, courts
opined that a judge could more readily assess the credibility and weight of
the plaintiff’s evidence after listening to the evidence at trial; the need to
assess the evidence severely limited the use of the summary judgment
procedure and enhanced the necessity for Rule 50 procedures as a second
test of evidentiary sufficiency. Finally, courts intimated that policy con-
siderations favored giving the plaintiff her day in court if there were any
doubt as to the facts.
The trilogy wreaks havoc with each of these propositions. First, it is
now settled law that the same standard applies in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment as applies in ruling on a Rule 50 motion. In Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,96 the Supreme Court noted that the standard for the
granting of summary judgment mirrored the standard for a directed ver-
dict under Rule 50(a).97 Describing the difference between the two devices
as “procedural” only, the Court ruled that “the inquiry under each is the
same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must pre-
vail as a matter of law.”98 Hence, the summary judgment inquiry
“unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.”99 After An-
derson, a ruling on summary judgment reflects the same inquiry that per-
tains under Rule 50.100
                                                                                                         
96. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
97. Id. at 250.
98. Id. at 251-52.
99. Id. at 252.
100. See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 85 (noting that Anderson “recast
summary judgment into the mold of a motion for a directed verdict”). This point is also under-
scored by the 1991 amendments to Rule 50(a), which articulated the standard for granting
judgment as a matter of law. The Advisory Committee Notes state that “[b]ecause [the articu-
lated] standard is also used as a reference point for entry of summary judgment under 56(a), it
serves to link the two related provisions.” FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee notes.
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The trilogy also makes clear that the plaintiff is expected to set forth all
her supporting proofs in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. In
Anderson, the Court held that the governing burden of proof, under sub-
stantive law, applied at the summary judgment stage.101 This meant that the
plaintiff was required to adduce affirmative evidence in order to defeat a
motion for summary judgment once the defendant satisfied its threshold
burden as the moving party.102 This was true, the Court observed, “even
where the evidence is likely to be within the possession of the defendant, as
long as the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to conduct discovery.”103 As
the Court stated in another trilogy decision: “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry
of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing suf-
ficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”104
In this regard, the trilogy fundamentally altered the summary judgment
landscape. Historically, summary judgment was a perfunctory procedural
mechanism that permitted a court to weed out the frivolous or sham
claim.105 It was not expected that the plaintiff would present all supporting
evidence at the summary judgment stage; the plaintiff could survive sum-
mary judgment so long as there was the “slightest doubt” as to whether she
could  develop the necessary facts at trial.106 By contrast, the trilogy effec-
tively requires a plaintiff to lay out her entire case in response to a motion
for summary judgment and thereby converts summary judgment into a
“full-dress-rehearsal” for the actual trial.107 The plaintiff is not required to
prove her case to the reviewing judge but is required to establish that she
has sufficient evidence to present the case to a jury. The era in which a
plaintiff could survive summary judgment by pointing to what the evi-
dence might eventually show at trial is long gone.
The argument that the court is better positioned to assess the suffi-
ciency of the plaintiff’s case—on the basis of “live” evidence—is also un-
dermined by the trilogy. As an initial matter, it is noteworthy that a
                                                                                                         
101. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-55.
102. Id. at 257.
103. Id. The assumption that the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to develop her case
through discovery is an important qualifier. Under Rule 56(f), a court is authorized to “order a
continuance” to permit additional discovery “[s]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential
to justify the party’s opposition.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). Obviously, summary judgment
should not be granted when the plaintiff can plausibly assert that additional, material proof
could be developed through further discovery. On the other hand, the availability of discovery
rights, as a prerequisite to granting summary judgment, is a double-edged sword. The fact that
the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to develop the facts supporting her case weakens the
complaint that the granting of summary judgment has unfairly deprived her of the ability to
prove her case.
104. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
105. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
107. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 87.
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court’s role in weighing evidence or assaying credibility in the context of
a Rule 50 motion is highly circumscribed. As the Supreme Court stated:
“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the draw-
ing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of
a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a
directed verdict.”108 While there may be limited circumstances in which a
court may, in passing on a Rule 50 motion, determine issues of credibility
and weight,109 such questions are generally reserved for the jury.
In any event, the trilogy makes clear that, to the extent courts are
permitted to weigh evidence under Rule 50, they are permitted to do so at
the summary judgment stage. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.,110 the Court held that summary judgment could be
granted in a case even though the plaintiff had produced expert reports
that supported the plaintiff’s theory.111 The Court ruled that the district
court had properly viewed these reports as “both implausible and incon-
sistent with record evidence.”112 In the view of one commentator, “By ex-
amining the plausibility of the plaintiff’s theory, the Court seemed to in-
struct the lower courts to weigh the evidence and to decide which infer-
ence was more reasonable in light of the evidence.”113 At the very least,
the Court authorized the trial court to conduct at summary judgment the
same inquiry—concerning the plausibility of the plaintiff’s case—that it
would make in ruling on a Rule 50 motion.114
Finally, any policy argument for delaying the resolution of the suffi-
ciency question until trial has surely been torpedoed by the trilogy. The
rise in the use of summary judgment corresponds with a broader cam-
paign to ease docket pressures by enhancing the case management power
of the federal courts.115 The trilogy gave legal force to the view that sum-
mary judgment could be an effective weapon for dealing with
“increasingly crowded dockets and rising litigation costs.”116 Virtually
                                                                                                         
108. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
109. See 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2527, at 285 (1995) (noting that “it is well settled that no weight is to be given
to testimony that is opposed to the laws of nature or undisputed physical facts”).
110. 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1020 (1987).
111. 481 U.S. at 1020.
112. 475 U.S. at 594 n.19.
113. McGinley, supra note 6, at 227; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 600 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (majority opinion suggesting that trial
judge “should go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for himself
whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff”).
114. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 468 (1992)
(stating that Matsushita demands “that the nonmoving party’s inferences be reasonable in order
to reach the jury”).
115. See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 73.
116. Schwarzer et al., supra note 15, at 450.
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every facet of federal practice and procedure now points toward the
speedy disposition of claims.
The trilogy has assigned a central role to the summary judgment pro-
cedure. Summary judgment has evolved from a rarely used procedural
mechanism into a major gatekeeping device by which courts resolve large
numbers of cases.117 The net result of these changes is that surviving
summary judgment is now an event of substantial consequence. When a
case survives a sufficiency test at summary judgment, the plaintiff has, by
definition, presented evidence from which a jury could find in her favor.
Given these changes, the historical view of the relationship between
summary judgment and the Rule 50 procedures is surely at peril. None of
the justifications for ignoring a previous decision at the summary judg-
ment stage survive the Supreme Court trilogy. Refusing to accord at least
some preclusive significance to a denial of summary judgment is now at
odds with the letter and spirit of summary judgment procedure and federal
practice.
V.   THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE: NO APPARENT CHANGE IN RULE 50
PRACTICE
In light of the above discussion, one might assume that the approach to
the granting of relief under Rule 50 would have undergone a substantial
transformation, concomitant with the change in summary judgment prac-
tice. In fact, there is little evidence that courts have modified their ap-
proach to the granting of relief under Rule 50. While the use of summary
judgment has grown exponentially, courts appear to have given little
thought to how this growth impacts Rule 50 practice. Indeed, if anything,
courts have continued to adhere to the historical view that the denial of
summary judgment has no impact on a subsequent Rule 50 motion.
One area of law that illustrates these developments concerns litigation
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).118
The ADEA prohibits discrimination against workers over the age of
forty.119 ADEA litigation has been prolific, both before and after the tril-
ogy. Under the ADEA, plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial.120
There is little doubt that the trilogy has had a profound impact on the
granting of summary judgment in ADEA cases. As documented in one re-
cent article, the sheer number of reported ADEA decisions involving the
                                                                                                         
117. See McGinley, supra note 6, at 228 n.111 (arguing on the basis of a statistical sample
of cases that the granting of summary judgment has substantially increased under the trilogy);
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 92 (concluding on the basis of a statistical sample
of cases that “the unmistakable message to the bar is that district courts are highly receptive to
summary judgment motions and, indeed, that such motions are being freely granted”).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988).
119. See id. § 631(a).
120. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978).
706 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:689
granting of summary judgment has risen sharply.121 Of the ADEA deci-
sions sampled in that article, the courts of appeal affirmed the grant of
summary judgment in over ninety percent of the cases.122 There are strong
indications that courts have interpreted the trilogy “to permit courts to
draw inferences in defendants’ favor, to weigh evidence, to decide the
credibility of witnesses, and to require plaintiffs to prove their cases at the
summary judgment stage.”123
On the other hand, there is very little indication that these changes in
the summary procedure have in any way impacted Rule 50 practice. In a
number of recent ADEA cases, courts have trumped a jury’s verdict in
favor of the plaintiff and granted judgment as a matter of law under Rule
50.124 In at least some of these cases, the defendant had previously moved
for summary judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency.125 There is
no indication that the courts in question accorded any legal significance to
the previous denial of summary judgment. A case that typifies this phe-
nomenon is Futrell v. J.I. Case.126 In Futrell, the plaintiff alleged that he
                                                                                                         
121. McGinley, supra note 6, at 228 n.111. The author notes that “[b]etween January and
June 1992, the courts of appeals reviewed 53 ADEA and Title VII cases in which the lower
courts had granted summary judgment.” Id. By contrast, “[b]efore the trilogy, from January to
June 1983, the courts of appeals reviewed only two ADEA and two Title VII cases on appeal
from grants of summary judgment for the defendant.” Id. There also is evidence of a pro-
nounced increase in the use of the summary judgment procedure in other areas of federal law.
See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 92 (citing to statistics that evidence a substan-
tial increase in the use of the summary judgment procedure).
122. McGinley, supra note 6, at 228 n.111.
123. Id. at 229 (citations omitted).
124. See, e.g., Walker v. Nationsbank of Florida N.A., 53 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1995);
Hayman v. National Academy of Sciences, 23 F.3d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Grizzle v. Travelers
Health Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 1994); Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co.,
999 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1993); Atkin v. Lincoln Property Co., 991 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1993); Per-
fetti v. First Nat’l Bank, 950 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1205 (1992); Billet
v. Cigna Corp., 940 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1991); Danielson v. City of Lorain, 938 F.2d 681 (6th
Cir. 1991); Aungst v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 937 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1991); Isenbergh v.
Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 1561 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Binder v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 847 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d in part, 57 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 1995);
Futrell v. J.I. Case, 838 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Wis. 1993), rev’d, 38 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 1994); see
Cavaliere, supra note 16, at 144 (stating that “affirmances of summary judgment and directed
verdicts in ADEA cases have been found in virtually all of the circuits”); Note, The Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for Change, 73 VA. L. REV.
601, 615 (1987) (urging that courts “have too frequently set aside verdicts that juries have re-
turned for ADEA plaintiffs”).
125. See, e.g., Walker, 53 F.3d at 1552; Perfetti, 950 F.2d at 450; Isenbergh, 856 F. Supp.
at 1564; Binder, 847 F. Supp. at 737 (on remand from reversal of summary judgment, 933 F.2d
187 (2d Cir. 1991)); Futrell, 838 F. Supp. at 401 (discussed infra notes 126-33 and accompanying
text).
126. 838 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Wis. 1993), rev’d, 38 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 1994). As indi-
cated, the district court’s decision in Futrell was reversed by the Seventh Circuit. The court of
appeal ruled that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict in
his favor. 38 F.3d at 346-47. The court did not address the issue of whether the district court’s
grant of judgment as a matter of law, on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, was inconsistent
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had been discharged because of his age, in violation of the ADEA. The
defendant responded that the plaintiff had been fired because of his bellig-
erent and uncooperative attitude.
Prior to trial, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient as a matter law to sustain a
finding of age discrimination. In a sixteen-page opinion, the district court
denied summary judgment.127 The court carefully surveyed the evidence
and concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that
the defendant willfully violated the ADEA.128
The case was tried by a jury, which found in favor of the plaintiff and
awarded more than $265,000 in damages.129 The defendant had moved for
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 and claimed that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of age discrimination.130 The Seventh
Circuit ruled in favor of the defendant and threw out the jury verdict.131
In granting the defendant’s postjudgment motion, the court made no
reference to its previous decision on summary judgment.132 The court re-
jected, on an item-by-item basis, the various proofs offered by the plain-
tiff and stated that the evidence did not, “on balance,” support the jury’s
verdict.133 The court offered no explanation as to why the evidence, which
had been sufficient to present a jury issue prior to trial, was no longer
sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict.
While cases such as Futrell suggest that courts have not modified their
approach to Rule 50 practice in response to changes in the summary
judgment procedure, a few courts have expressly considered the issue
post-trilogy.134 Surprisingly, these courts have continued to adhere to the
historical view and have relied on many of the same grounds advanced
prior to the trilogy.135
                                                                                                         
with the court’s previous denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment made on the
same grounds.
127. See Decision and Order, Case No. 88-C-1028, at 15 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 8, 1992).
128. Id.
129. 38 F.3d 342, 344 (7th Cir. 1994).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Futrell, 838 F. Supp. at 401.
133. Id. at 410.
134. The fact that courts have not modified their approach to Rule 50 practice also is evi-
denced by decisions outside the context of the ADEA. Rule 50 judgments on evidentiary
grounds continue to be a commonplace feature of federal practice. See, e.g., Clark v. Brien,
59 F.3d 1082, 1086-89 (10th Cir. 1995); Favorito v. Pannell, 27 F.3d 716, 719-22 (1st Cir.
1994); Bankers Trust Co. v. Lee Keeling & Assocs., Inc., 20 F.3d 1092, 1099-1101 (10th Cir.
1994); Peus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 513-19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 U.S. 573
(1994); Jordan-Milton Mach. v. F/V Teresa Marie, II, 978 F.2d 32, 34-36 (1st Cir. 1992);
Garrett v. Barnes, 961 F.2d 629, 631-35 (7th Cir. 1992); PPM Am., Inc. v. Marriott Corp.,
875 F. Supp. 289, 293-304 (D. Md. 1995); Jones v. Lederle Lab., 785 F. Supp. 1123, 1125-
27 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 982 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1992).
135. See infra notes 136-54 and accompanying text.
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     In Thorpe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.,136 for example, the First
Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that it was improper for the dis-
trict court to have granted the defendant’s Rule 50 motion in light of the
court’s previous denial of summary judgment.137 The plaintiff stressed that
in denying summary judgment, the court had suggested that “ ‘reasonable
minds could differ’ and the jury should therefore decide the matter.”138
Citing a pre-trilogy decision, the court of appeal refused to accord any
presumptive significance to the summary judgment denial and ruled that a
denial of summary judgment does not foreclose the entry of a directed
verdict on the same claim.139 As the court explained: “Evidence adduced
at trial will almost always differ in degree, force, and quantity from that
submitted on a motion for summary judgment. The earlier denial of sum-
mary judgment standing alone in no way impeaches the later directed
verdict.”140
Similarly, in Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc.,141 the Fifth Circuit
expressed the view that its reversal of the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment would not preclude the district court from issuing a di-
rected verdict at the time of trial.142 Again, the court drew support from a
pre-trilogy case.143 The court stated that there were “disturbing inconsis-
tencies” in the plaintiff’s case that “could well melt away under the heat
of trial and the bright light of cross-examination.”144 While noting that
“the legal standards for summary judgment and directed verdict are the
same,” the court emphasized that “after trial, the district court will be
faced with a different set of facts to be weighed under that standard.”145
The views expressed in these cases are puzzling. If the point is that the
“force” of the plaintiff’s evidence can differ at trial, in the sense that the
jury can disbelieve the plaintiff’s witnesses or reject the inferences sug-
gested by the plaintiff’s evidence, one would have to agree.146 It is the dif-
                                                                                                         
136. 984 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1993).
137. Id. at 545.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 822-23 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1100 (1986)).
140. Id.
141. 851 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1988).
142. Id. at 1508.
143. Id. (citing Pruet Prod. Co. v. Ayles, 784 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1986)).
144. Id.
145. Id.; see also Newharbor Partners, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Co., 961 F.2d 294, 297 (1st Cir.
1992) (stressing that “[t]here is nothing unorthodox . . . about denying a motion for summary
judgment because of a doubt whether triable facts existed and later granting a directed verdict
after the critical facts had been developed, even if both motions were made on the same
grounds”); Jones v. Lederle Lab., 785 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (E.D.N.Y.) (“Denial of a motion
for summary judgment does not prevent a court from granting a subsequent Rule 50 motion by
the same party with respect to the same claim.”), aff’d, 982 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1992).
146. This seemed to be the principal focus of the court in Bienkowski, which emphasized
the ways in which the “jury” or the “fact finder” could reject the theories suggested by the
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ferent nature of the jury’s fact-finding role that militates against the
granting of either summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law un-
der Rule 50 in cases in which there are genuine issues of disputed fact.
The argument, however, that a “live” trial will put the court in a better
position to resolve the issue of evidentiary sufficiency, as a matter of law,
does not hold up. Courts do not generally weigh the evidence or resolve
issues of credibility in ruling upon a Rule 50 motion.147 The “bright lights
of cross-examination” may lead the jury to reject the plaintiff’s case, but
the judge’s role in passing upon the legal sufficiency of evidence is not
generally affected by the give-and-take of a trial.148
Further, the trilogy strongly suggests that there is substantial parity
between the court’s roles at the summary judgment and Rule 50 stages.149
Contrary to the First Circuit’s suggestion in Thorpe,150 plaintiffs are ex-
pected to put forth their entire case at the summary judgment stage.151 To
the extent the weighing of evidence is in any way permitted in the context
of a Rule 50 motion, it is equally permitted, indeed required, at the sum-
mary judgment stage.152 The Supreme Court has not simply stated that the
same standards apply in ruling on a summary judgment or Rule 50 mo-
tion; it has transformed the summary judgment procedure into a “mini-
trial” on the merits.153 One of the clear lessons of the trilogy—or at least
one of its effects—is that courts can fully judge evidentiary sufficiency, as
a legal matter, on the basis of the documentary evidence advanced in re-
sponse to a summary judgment motion.154 After the trilogy, the category
of cases that can survive summary judgment, yet be tossed out under Rule
50, should be narrow indeed.
The unfairness of the dual approach suggested by the above cases is
manifest. On one hand, plaintiffs are told that they are expected to put on
their entire case in order to avoid summary judgment. The point of the
summary judgment procedure, they are told, is to test the evidence under
the same standard that applies in determining evidentiary sufficiency un-
der Rule 50. Courts fully assess the plaintiff’s evidence and permit the
                                                                                                         
plaintiff’s evidence. 851 F.2d at 1508. A denial of summary judgment does not entitle the
plaintiff to a favorable reception by the jury. The fact, however, that a plaintiff’s case may not
withstand the rigors of the adversarial system—when the case is tested in open court—does not
speak to the court’s role in ruling on a Rule 50 motion.
147. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
148. One can conceive of circumstances in which a plaintiff’s case would become so unrav-
eled at trial that a judge could grant relief as a matter of law. However, this should be the excep-
tion, not the rule. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances under
which courts could properly grant a Rule 50 motion after having denied summary judgment).
149. See supra notes 96-114 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
154. Supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff’s case to go forward only if “reasonable jurors could find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.”155
Once the plaintiff survives summary judgment, the rules suddenly
change. Plaintiffs are told that surviving summary judgment was really of
no importance at all because the evidence at trial can differ in “degree,
force, and quantity from that submitted on a motion for summary judg-
ment.”156 The law cannot have it both ways. The changes in the summary
judgment procedure necessitate some corresponding modification in the
Rule 50 procedures.
VI.   PROPOSED STANDARD
Based on the foregoing, Rule 50 practice must be modified. Where a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment—on grounds of evidentiary in-
sufficiency—has been denied, that denial should have residual meaning
once the case proceeds to trial. The fundamental change in the nature of
the summary judgment procedure must have some legal impact on the use
of the Rule 50 procedures as a second test of evidentiary sufficiency.
The legal doctrine that is most relevant to the issue addressed in this
Article is the law of the case doctrine. “Under the doctrine of the ‘law of
the case,’ a decision on an issue of law made by the court at one stage of
a case becomes a binding precedent to be followed in successive stages of
the same litigation except in unusual circumstances.”157 The law of the
case doctrine can apply in two circumstances. First, the doctrine pre-
cludes a court from reconsidering its own decision made at an earlier
stage of the proceeding, absent clear and convincing reasons to reexamine
the prior ruling.158 Additionally, the doctrine requires that a lower court
must adhere to the decision of a superior appellate tribunal on remand.159
Law of the case rules “have developed to maintain consistency and avoid
reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single con-
tinuing lawsuit.”160
There are two ways in which the law of the case doctrine could be
used in the context of Rule 50 motions. The most obvious case would be
one in which an appellate court has reversed a district court’s grant of
summary judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency. Under the
law of the case theory, the appellate court’s ruling on summary judgment
                                                                                                         
155. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
156. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 984 F.2d 541, 545 (1st Cir. 1993).
157. Abbadessa v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 987 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1993).
158. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1226 (1983).
159. Id.
160. 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478, at
788 (1995); for an example of how courts have applied the law of the case doctrine, see infra
notes 177-83 and accompanying text (applying doctrine to successive motions for summary
judgment).
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would establish the legal proposition that the plaintiff’s case is sufficiently
strong to present a factual question for the jury’s resolution. Because the
legal standard for summary judgment is now identical to the standard
applied under Rule 50, the appellate court’s reversal would dictate rejec-
tion of a defendant’s renewed challenge to evidentiary sufficiency at the
Rule 50 stage.
The doctrine also could be employed in circumstances in which the
district court itself has denied summary judgment and is then presented
with a Rule 50 motion. Under the law of the case approach, the district
court would be presumptively bound by its previous ruling on summary
judgment. While the district court’s reliance on the law of the case would
not preclude review of the issue by the court of appeal,161 the appellate
court could insist on adherence to the previous order absent circumstances
that would justify reconsideration.162
There are some important caveats to the law of the case approach.
First, the law of the case doctrine would apply only where the issues pre-
sented in the context of the Rule 50 motion are the same as those previ-
ously raised at summary judgment. Thus, the mere fact that a defendant
has unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment on the ground of evi-
dentiary insufficiency would not bar the use of a Rule 50 motion to raise
other issues that might arise in the course of a trial. The law of the case
doctrine would apply in cases where the defendant mounts an attack on
the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s case at summary judgment and then seeks
to renew the argument of evidentiary insufficiency at trial.
Second, the law of the case doctrine does not impose an absolute legal
bar to consideration of previously resolved issues. The doctrine simply
expresses the courts’ practice of refusing to reopen what has been de-
cided; it does not impose a limit on judicial power.163 The doctrine does
not apply where “the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially dif-
ferent, controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law
applicable to such issues, or the decision was clearly erroneous and would
work a manifest injustice.”164 If a plaintiff’s case substantially unravels at
                                                                                                         
161. See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988); Co-
hen v. Bucci, 905 F.2d 1111, 1112 (7th Cir. 1990); Cardwell v. Kurtz, 765 F.2d 776, 778
(9th Cir. 1985); 1B JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.404 (4.-1), at II-
12-13 (2d ed. 1995).
162. See, e.g., Virgin Atl. Airways v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1254-55
(2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 820 (1992); Wzorek v. City of Chicago, 906 F.2d
1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. City of Chicago, 853 F.2d 572, 576-77 (7th Cir.
1988).
163. See, e.g., Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912).
164. White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1967); accord United States v. Riv-
era-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 151 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 862 (1991); Vucinich v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 803 F.2d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Korean Air
Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 798 F. Supp. 755, 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Pincus v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 752 F. Supp. 871, 873 (E.D. Wis. 1990).
712 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:689
trial or there is an intervening change in the governing law that affects the
outcome, a court can set aside a previous ruling. The doctrine accords le-
gal significance to the previous decision but does not tie the court’s hands
where the circumstances justify reconsideration.165
With these caveats in mind, use of the law of the case doctrine in this
context seems well-grounded in the existing legal framework. First, em-
ploying the law of the case doctrine would not be inconsistent with the
procedural rules themselves. While Rule 50 authorizes motions for judg-
ment as a matter of law, it in no way implies that the court is to conduct
its inquiry without regard to a previous ruling on evidentiary sufficiency.
Indeed, the 1991 amendments to the rule were designed, in part, to sug-
gest the “link” between Rule 50 and Rule 56.166 In particular, the Rule’s
use of the term “judgment as a matter of law” called “attention to the re-
lationship between the two rules.”167 It is precisely this close relationship
that supports application of the law of the case doctrine.
Nor is the law of the case approach, as applied to a district court’s
previous denial of summary judgment, inconsistent with the rule of nonfinal-
ity concerning pretrial orders.168 The law of the case doctrine does not
mean that a previous decision of a court takes on the character of a final,
binding judgment. It simply means that, as a matter of sound practice,
courts should not reopen issues that have been fully aired and resolved. A
court’s denial of summary judgment would not be final in the sense that
the court would be deprived of the legal authority to revisit the issue of
evidentiary sufficiency.
Further, application of the law of the case doctrine to issues of eviden-
tiary sufficiency is well-grounded in the law. Courts have long recognized
that the law of the case doctrine applies to a court’s determination of evi-
dentiary sufficiency.169 Thus, they have applied the doctrine to bar entry
of judgment under Rule 50 in cases where a previous grant of judgment
under Rule 50, on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, was reversed by
the court of appeal.170 Issues of fact are especially unsuited for reconsid-
eration when there is no new significant evidence presented in the case.171
                                                                                                         
165. 1B MOORE, supra note 161, ¶ 0.404(1), at II-9 (“The doctrine of the law of the case
is, then, a heavy deterrent to vacillation on arguable issues, but not designed to prevent the
correction of plain error or injustice.”).
166. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4478, at 799-800.
167. FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee notes, 1991 Amendment. It is also of note
that Rule 16(e) substantially limits the authority of courts to modify orders made after a final
pretrial conference. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(e) (stating that such orders “shall be modified only to
prevent manifest injustice”). Applying the law of the case doctrine to issues of evidentiary suf-
ficiency previously litigated at the summary judgment stage is consistent with the case man-
agement policies reflected in Rule 16(e).
168. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
169. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4478, at 800 n.33.
170. See e.g., Gates v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 881 F.2d 215, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990); Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 804 F.2d 1097, 1099 (9th
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In fact, at least one court has applied the law of the case doctrine to bar
consideration of the issue of evidentiary sufficiency at the Rule 50 stage in a
case in which the appeals court had previously reversed a denial of sum-
mary judgment. In Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,172
the Ninth Circuit held that a district court had erred in directing a verdict in
favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff’s evidence was insuf-
ficient to establish the elements of her claim.173 The Ninth Circuit noted that
the court of appeal had specifically held that the “facts before the court
were sufficient to raise factual questions as to defendant’s state of mind and
the factors determinative of the duty owed the plaintiff” when it reversed a
previous grant of summary judgment.174 The Ninth Circuit opined that be-
cause the court of appeal had found in the first appeal “that there were dis-
puted issues of material fact, it followed that the plaintiff was entitled to
have those issues resolved by the jury if her evidence held up at trial and if
no other issues foreclosed her claim.”175 Noting that a review of the record
confirmed that the requisite evidence was produced at trial, the court held
that the law of the case doctrine required the district court to submit the
case to the jury.176
The law of the case approach also is supported by the judicial treatment
of successive motions for summary judgment on issues of evidentiary suffi-
ciency. As mentioned above, the law of the case doctrine can apply even as
to the previous orders of the same district court.177 Courts have long re-
jected the view that a district court’s denial of summary judgment precludes
the court, as a matter of law, from entertaining a renewed motion for sum-
mary judgment by the same party. Thus, they have held, consistent with the
law of the case doctrine, that a court may revisit the issue of evidentiary
sufficiency at the summary judgment stage when the subsequent motion is
based on new evidence or an expanded evidentiary record.178
                                                                                                         
Cir. 1986); Otten v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 538 F.2d 210, 212-13 (8th Cir. 1976); Lincoln Nat’l Life
Ins. Co. v. Roosth, 306 F.2d 110, 112-15 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
171. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4478, at 799-800.
172. 803 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1986).
173. Id. at 458-60.
174. Id. at 459.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
178. See e.g., Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d 243,
251 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 727 F.2d 707, 709 (8th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Horton, 622 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1980); Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 856 (1979); Kirby v. P.R.
Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 904, 913 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974); see
also Abbadessa v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 987 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing
that law of the case doctrine did not bar court from entertaining a second motion for summary
judgment where the issue raised in the second motion had not been decided by the district
court); Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943, 948 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that court could reconsider
previous denial of summary judgment where required by the “demands of justice”).
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On the other hand, courts have recognized that the policies behind the
law of the case doctrine are implicated by permitting reconsideration of
successive motions for summary judgment.179 A court should not recon-
sider a previous denial of summary judgment unless “good reason is
shown why a prior denial of a motion for summary judgment is no longer
applicable or should be departed from.”180 The law of the case doctrine
generally bars consideration of a successive summary judgment motion in
cases where none of the exceptions to the doctrine apply.181 While the law
does not in all circumstances immunize the first ruling from reconsidera-
tion,182 it does require the district court to “balance the need for finality
against the forcefulness of any new evidence and the demands of jus-
tice.”183
In any event, while there are grounds for applying the law of the case
doctrine to successive motions for summary judgment, the argument for
applying the doctrine is much stronger once the action proceeds to trial.
As one commentator noted, application of the law of the case doctrine
may well turn on “distinctions that rest on the stage that the proceeding
has reached.”184 As a case progresses toward trial, often early pretrial
rulings may be subject to reconsideration.185 Yet, as a trial comes closer to
its final disposition, the need for stability becomes paramount.186 Where a
case is still in the preliminary stages, reconsideration of a court’s ruling
                                                                                                         
179. See e.g., Wright v. Cayan, 817 F.2d 999, 1002 n.3 (2d Cir.) (reconsidering denial of
summary judgment offends “general practice of refusing to reopen what has been decided”),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987); Allstate Fin. Corp. v. Zimmerman, 296 F.2d 797, 799 (5th
Cir. 1961) (expressing general disapproval of “piecemeal consideration of successive motions
for summary judgment, since defendants might well normally be held to the requirement that
they present their strongest case for summary judgment when the matter is first raised”) (cited
in Fernandez v. Bankers Nat. Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 569 (11th Cir. 1990)).
180. Kirby, 489 F.2d at 913; see also Abbadessa, 987 F.2d at 22 (suggesting that the law
of the case doctrine would apply to the subsequent motion “except in unusual circumstances”);
Federal Ins. Co. v. Scarsella Bros., 931 F.2d 599, 601-02 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that
there are circumstances where a district court “establish[es] law of the case when it denies a
summary judgment motion”); Marvin v. King, 734 F. Supp. 346, 351 (S.D. Ind. 1990)
(stating that a court should not “set aside the law of the case lightly” by reconsidering a previ-
ous denial of summary judgment).
181. See e.g., Cardwell v. Kurtz, 765 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1985); Kern-Tulare Water
Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665-66 (E.D. Cal. 1986), rev’d in part, 828
F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988); Erie Conduit Corp. v. Metro-
politan Asphalt Paving Ass’n, 560 F. Supp. 305, 307-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
182. See, e.g., Dictograph Prod. Co. v. Sonotone Corp., 230 F.2d 131, 135 (2d Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 883 (1956).
183. See, e.g., Corporacion De Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int’l, 608 F.2d 43, 48
(2d Cir. 1979).
184. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 4478, at 791.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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on evidentiary sufficiency can be more readily supported.187 However,
when a case survives the summary judgment stage and proceeds to trial—
and certainly where an appellate court has reversed a grant of summary
judgment—there is a strong argument that the system’s interest in stability
dictates adherence to a previous ruling on evidentiary sufficiency absent
the kinds of factors that would permit reconsideration of the sufficiency
question under the law of the case doctrine.188
If barring reconsideration of a court’s ruling on evidentiary sufficiency
appears too extreme a measure, it is important to reemphasize that the law
of the case approach would not preclude courts, in all cases, from taking
a second look at the plaintiff’s evidence. As noted above, some courts
have suggested that a denial of summary judgment should have no effect
on a Rule 50 ruling because the character of the plaintiff’s evidence, at
trial, is invariably different.189 It may be true that a plaintiff’s case so de-
teriorates at trial that a court could properly grant judgment as a matter of
law under Rule 50 even where it has previously ruled in the plaintiff’s fa-
vor at summary judgment. It is also true, however, that differences be-
tween the summary judgment and Rule 50 procedures have narrowed over
time and that, in many cases, there will be no significant change in the es-
sential proofs put forth by the plaintiff. If there is a substantial deteriora-
tion of the plaintiff’s case, a court may have grounds for setting aside a
previous ruling on evidentiary sufficiency and entering judgment under
Rule 50. However, absent such a documented change, the court should
not be permitted to stop the plaintiff’s case merely because, on further
reflection, the plaintiff’s case appears weak.
While there are grounds for applying the law of the case approach
where a court has ruled on a motion for summary judgment, what about
cases in which summary judgment has not been sought? Obviously, in any
technical sense, the law of the case approach would not apply. Yet, there
may still be grounds for drawing significance from the defendant’s failure
to seek summary judgment. A failure to move for summary judgment
could be seen as pregnant in the sense that the relatively generous stan-
dards for summary judgment now in vogue invite the filing of summary
judgment motions in any case in which there is a plausible argument that
the plaintiff’s evidence is deficient as a matter of law. Moreover, to the
extent that summary judgment is viewed as a device by which the system
identifies the cases worthy of substantial resource commitment, a court
                                                                                                         
187. See, e.g., Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 184-85
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 171 (1993) (suggesting that courts should be free to
reconsider a denial of summary judgment at the preliminary stages of the case).
188. This is particularly true given the extent to which summary judgment has emerged as
a major gatekeeping device in federal litigation. See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text
(discussing policy arguments in favor of treating a previous denial of summary judgment as
law of the case).
189. See supra notes 134-45.
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may be inclined to sanction the defendant who could have raised the suf-
ficiency question at an earlier stage. While there may be no legal ground
for enforcing adherence to such an approach, the fundamental changes in
the summary judgment procedure may justify a skeptical judicial response
to claims of evidentiary insufficiency raised, for the first time, at trial.
VII.   BROADER CONSIDERATIONS
For the reasons discussed above, there are substantial legal grounds for
subjecting Rule 50 challenges to evidentiary sufficiency to the law of the
case doctrine. Such an approach also is supported by broader policy con-
siderations.
The strongest policy argument in favor of the law of the case approach
is that it best serves the emerging role of summary judgment in federal
practice. The changes in the summary judgment procedure are undesir-
able. Yet, for better or worse, summary judgment has been transformed
from a rarely used procedural tool into a major gatekeeping device in fed-
eral litigation.190 Clearing the hurdle of summary judgment is now a sig-
nificant event in federal practice.
This gatekeeping function is compromised by permitting the defendant
to have a second bite at the sufficiency apple.191 The increased use of
summary judgment is tied to broader case management concerns.192 The
granting of summary judgment enforces these concerns by weeding out
the unworthy claims. So too, however, does the denial of summary judg-
ment by identifying the cases that are worthy of trial and, thus, the ex-
penditure of scarce judicial resources. Permitting a defendant to relitigate
the issue of evidentiary sufficiency defeats the case management functions
of the revitalized summary judgment procedure.
In addition, giving a court free rein to reconsider its ruling on eviden-
tiary sufficiency blunts the extent to which a denial of summary judgment
facilitates settlement. In a system in which summary judgment is rarely
granted, a decision to deny summary judgment may have little residual
consequence. In the current legal milieu, however, the denial should have
the effect of signaling that the plaintiff has a substantial case that can prevail
before a jury. If the defendant knows that her opportunities for relitigating
the sufficiency question are limited, she may be inclined to settle the case.
She may be less willing to entertain settlement, on the other hand, when she
knows that she can continue, with impunity, to press the sufficiency point.
By the same token, a rule which accords legal significance to a denial of
summary judgment may also inject some well-needed discipline into the
                                                                                                         
190. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
191. The argument in this section of the Article tracks, in some respects, the “Economic
Analysis of Summary Judgment” in Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 94-118.
192. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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summary judgment procedure. There are indications that defendants are al-
most routinely seeking summary judgment.193 This has disturbing conse-
quences, particularly given the propensity of at least some courts to weigh
the evidence at the summary judgment stage and assume the role of fact
finder.194 Even when a grant of summary judgment is reversed on appeal,
there is a substantial waste of judicial resources at the preliminary stage of
the case. Ironically, the current system may actually have the effect of in-
creasing unnecessary litigation by encouraging the improvident use of the
summary judgment procedure. If defendants know that there is a significant
cost associated with defeat at the summary judgment stage, they may  limit
their resort to the summary judgment procedure to more appropriate
cases.195
The law of the case approach also would provide some much needed
balancing to the summary judgment procedure. The changes in summary
judgment have imposed an enormous burden on plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are
forced to put forth their entire case at the summary judgment stage and
withstand substantial judicial scrutiny of their proofs. Yet, plaintiffs must
then face the additional hurdle of surviving sufficiency challenges at the
Rule 50 stage. Having survived the severe sufficiency test now imposed at
summary judgment, plaintiffs deserve to receive some commensurate
benefit once the case proceeds to trial.
It might be argued that this approach would solidify the existing ten-
dency on the part of courts to misuse the summary judgment procedure. If a
court knows that its ruling on summary judgment can be freely revisited, it
may be more inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to the plaintiff’s
case.196 The plaintiff might lose that benefit if the court knows that its
ruling will carry forward to the Rule 50 stage.
If there were any realistic hope that courts would turn back the clock
and adopt more restrictive standards for granting summary judgment, this
argument might be persuasive. A preferable system would be a system
that limited the use of summary judgment and deferred challenges to evi-
dentiary sufficiency for disposition under Rule 50. However, that is not
                                                                                                         
193. See Thomas J. Piskorski, The Growing Judicial Acceptance of Summary Judgment in
Age Discrimination Cases, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 245, 254 (1992) (“In today’s litigation
climate, . . . [defendants] must view every case as one in which a motion for summary judg-
ment will be filed and from day one begin developing a record that maximizes the chance of
success of such a motion.”).
194. See McGinley, supra note 6, at 228-29.
195. This point may appear to be inconsistent with the assertion above that courts should
look skeptically upon sufficiency challenges raised for the first time at the Rule 50 stage. How-
ever, that point was made in the context of current conditions concerning the use of the sum-
mary judgment procedure. My strong preference is for approaches which would reduce the use
of summary judgment.
196. This is evident from the cases, cited above (supra notes 56-69 and accompanying
text), in which courts willingly passed on the issue of evidentiary sufficiency at the summary
judgment stage precisely because the issue could be taken up anew at the Rule 50 stage.
718 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:689
the system we have. The heightened use of the summary judgment proce-
dure seems well-engrained in the law. If summary judgment is to play the
case management role now envisioned by courts, it is only fair that the
change in summary judgment be reflected in how courts respond to Rule
50 motions.
It might also be argued that this approach places too much reliance on
the court’s initial parsing of the evidence at the summary judgment stage.
A court, after all, might make a mistake in judging evidentiary sufficiency
that could be corrected at the Rule 50 stage. This is always a risk when
applying the law of the case doctrine. However, it is a risk that is sub-
stantially reduced by the degree to which courts now view summary
judgment as a significant procedural event and take care to make the ap-
propriate determination of evidentiary sufficiency. On balance, the risk of
being saddled with a mistaken denial of summary judgment is outweighed
by the costs to the system in permitting relitigation of the sufficiency
question.
The more serious concern is that judges will use the opportunity of a
Rule 50 motion to interpose their own views of the evidence. A court that
denies summary judgment may well have made the correct determination
with respect to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence. That same
court, however, may have second thoughts about the plaintiff’s case, not
because of any mistake in its previous decision, but because the “live”
case seems less persuasive. It is for the jury, not the judge, to assess the
persuasive force of the plaintiff’s evidence. If summary judgment is to as-
sume the central role marked out by the trilogy, it may well be that the
legal question of evidentiary sufficiency is best assessed under the more
sterile conditions that exist at that stage of the case.
VIII.   CONCLUSION
The substantial change in the summary judgment procedure has had a
profound impact on federal practice. Courts have reconstructed summary
judgment as a vital case management tool. While they once denied sum-
mary judgment on the slightest possibility that the plaintiff could eventu-
ally advance a jury-submissible case, courts now insist upon proof that
affirmatively establishes the plaintiff’s entitlement to jury consideration.
Given the substantial changes in the summary judgment procedure, the
historical justifications for permitting reconsideration of the sufficiency
question, at the Rule 50 stage, no longer hold true. The plaintiff is ex-
pected to put forth all her evidence in response to a summary judgment
motion; the standard for granting summary judgment is identical to the
standard for granting judgment under Rule 50. A court’s decision on evi-
dentiary sufficiency at summary judgment should bar reconsideration of
the sufficiency question absent the types of intervening changes that
would justify reconsideration under the law of the case doctrine.
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